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Abstract 
 
 
This paper demonstrates that bad news herding is actually accompanied by bad news over-
reporting. By focusing on write-offs during two major recessions of 2001 and 2008 and taking 
advantage of a unique hand-collected dataset on reversals of restructuring charges, we document 
that when firms herd in their negative reports, they over-state bad news, creating a cushion that 
can be reversed in the future. Specifically, we show that: (1) large write-offs by early firms are 
followed by clustered write-offs by their peer firms; (2) herding firms over-report and 
subsequently partially reverse their write-offs; and (3) the reversals help herding firms to meet 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts that otherwise would not be met. Taken together, these 
results lend credence to the following mechanism behind bad news herding: firms strategically 
engage in herding with excessive bad news reports to benefit from subsequent reversals.  
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1. Introduction 
“If you are a smart CEO, you’re going to write off everything and then some, 
maybe even to below-market prices, because you’re going to be hidden in the 
woodshed with everybody else” (Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2007 “Are 
Banks’ Charges Result of Honest Tack, Or “Big Bath” Strategy?”) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Managers are often influenced by other firms’ actions when making their own decisions. The 
phenomenon of herding has been documented in many types of business decisions, such as 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, institutional investors’ trades, product choices in online 
marketplaces, and lending decisions.
1
 In the financial reporting setting, a growing number of 
studies finds that firms engage in bad news herding by clustering negative announcements, such 
as earnings warnings, restatements, and failures to meet analyst forecasts (Tse and Tucker 2010; 
Myers, Scholz, and Sharp 2013; Bratten, Payne, and Thomas et al. 2016). While prior studies 
imply that herding is a beneficial strategy for firms because it helps reduce the blame for a 
negative event, literature does not empirically investigate the mechanism behind negative news 
herding and the gains that this strategy can bring.  
In this paper, we show that firms can benefit from bad news herding by over-stating bad 
news, which creates reserves to be exploited in the future. Focusing on write-offs during 
recessions and taking advantage of a unique hand-collected dataset on reversals of restructuring 
charges, we document that when firms herd in their negative reports, they in fact take the 
opportunity to overstate bad news, creating a cushion that can be reversed in the future. 
Specifically, we show that: (1) during economic downturns, large write-offs by early firms are 
followed by clustered write-offs by their peer firms; (2) the herding firms over-report (engage in 
                                                 
1
 See Trueman (1994), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), Welch (2000), and Clement and Tse (2005), Wermers 
(1999), Sias (2004), and Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2013), Huang and Chen (2006), Herzenstein, Dholakia, and 
Andrew (2011), as well as Zhang and Liu (2012). 
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a “big bath”2) and subsequently partially reverse their write-offs; and (3) the reversals help 
herding firms meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. Taken together, these results lend 
credence to the following mechanism behind bad news herding: firms strategically engage in 
herding with excessive bad news reports to benefit from subsequent reversals.  
The key friction enabling this strategic behavior is the asymmetric market response to 
initial announced write-offs compared to the following clustered write-offs. Several factors 
documented in psychology and behavioral finance literature demonstrate decreased market 
response to clustered news than to standalone news. First, concurrent announcements lead to 
investor distraction, lowering investor attention and muting the market response (Hirshleifer, 
Lim, and Teoh 2009). Second, contrast effects cause bad news to be perceived as less negative 
when it follows other bad news. Empirical literature documents contrast effects in individuals’ 
perceptions of domains ranging from crime (Pepitone and DiNubile 1976) and attractiveness 
(Kenrick and Gutierres 1980) to earnings reports (Hartzmark and Shue 2017). Finally, 
covariation theory posits that correlated outcomes across different entities are less likely to be 
attributed to individual entities than standalone outcomes (Kelley 1967; Koonce and Mercer 
2005). In our setting, covariation theory predicts that investors draw less inference about 
individual firms from clustered announcements. These channels suggest that the market reaction 
to write-offs issued during an economy- or industry-wide downturn, after other firms have 
already reported negative news, will induce a milder reaction. By contrast, subsequent 
performance improvement helped by the reversals of excessive write-offs, occurring as 
standalone pieces of news, will prompt a more sizable positive response. 
                                                 
2
 “Big bath” has become a general term that describes a large asset write-down or other non-recurring charge 
strategically taken by a management team that makes the current period’s poor results look even worse, but enables 
reporting better future earnings. 
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We test our proposed mechanism of big bath herding in the setting of the two most recent 
recessions recorded by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): the 2001 recession 
induced by the dot-com crash and the 2008 recession induced by the financial markets 
meltdown.
3
 This setting presents negative economy- or industry-wide shocks that affect a group 
of firms. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) require firms, whose losses exceed 
a materiality threshold, to disclose their losses immediately.
4
 After the most severely affected 
firms (Leaders) report write-offs, behavioral factors (distraction, contrast effects, and covariation 
theory) point towards the market’s decreased sensitivity to subsequent bad news reports. As a 
result, the less severely impacted firms (Followers) might choose to accelerate bad news 
disclosure and write-off devaluated assets even when these write-offs could be delayed. More 
importantly, given the market’s reduced sensitivity to reported write-offs, it becomes optimal for 
Followers to undertake a big bath and over-report bad news, writing down assets below their fair 
value if such excessive write-offs can be exploited in the future.
5
 It is important to note that the 
factors muting the market response to Followers’ reports do not apply to the early reports of the 
Leaders, since the first firms to report do not benefit from distraction, contrast effects, or 
covariation. Thus, firms with material losses, which are required to report their losses 
immediately, face no incentive to engage in excessive write-offs. Empirically, for each recession, 
we classify firms into Leaders and Followers based on the timing of their write-offs. We define 
                                                 
3
 The Business Cycle Dating Committee of the NBER maintains a chronology of the U.S. business cycles, which is 
comprised of alternating dates of peaks and troughs in economic activity. A recession is defined as a period between 
a peak and a trough, lasting from a few months to more than a year, when a significant decline in economic activity 
is observed. The recession of 2001 spans from March 2001 to November of 2001, while the recession of 2008 spans 
from December 2007 to June 2009. 
4
 GAAP requires firms to write-down most non-financial assets when their fair values drop sufficiently below their 
carrying values, but generally does not allow firms to write-up assets when the fair values rise. Write-downs reduce 
a firm’s stock price (Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 1996), providing incentives to delay such disclosure (Dye 1990; 
Dye and Sridhar 1995; Shin 2003). However, if the reduction in asset value is material enough, managers must 
disclose bad news to comply with GAAP and avoid potential litigation (Kothari, Li, and Short 2009). 
5
 For example, a big bath can allow a firm to smooth earnings in later periods (Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002) 
or to meet analysts’ forecasts (Moehrle 2002). 
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“Leaders” as firms that make write-offs around the beginning of the recession, and “Followers” 
as firms that make write-offs during the subsequent periods. 
We confirm our prediction that Followers time their write-offs to occur soon after their 
peers’ write-offs by showing that the probability of a Follower’s disclosure at a specific time is 
positively associated with the number of peer write-offs in the preceding three months.
6
Next, we 
find evidence of the proposed muted response to Followers’ reports: while Leaders’ stock prices 
decline with their write-offs, Followers’ stock prices are not sensitive to their reports. This 
suggests a strategic motive for the Followers’ herding reports.  
We present three pieces of evidence pointing to Followers’ strategic behavior of taking 
advantage of the reduced stock price sensitivity by engaging in excessive write-offs of their 
assets. First, we consider Leaders’ and Followers’ post-disclosure performance. If Followers 
indeed excessively write-off assets by shifting their future accrued expenses into the current 
reporting period, then we expect that, compared to Leaders, Followers will report a higher future 
bottom-line income, which includes all accrual accounting items such as depreciation and 
amortization as well as other non-operating expenses. By contrast, Followers’ operating cash 
flows should be indistinguishable from those of Leaders, because the cash flow measure is 
accrual free. Consistent with the excessiveness of Followers’ write-offs, we find that Followers 
report a greater increase in future industry-adjusted median returns on assets (ROA) than 
Leaders, while showing no difference in future operating cash flows. Second, consistent with the 
big bath strategy, which allows managers to utilize reserves created by excessive non-recurring 
charges (Moehrle 2002), we find that Followers are more likely than Leaders to meet/beat 
analyst earnings forecasts during the two years after the write-offs. 
                                                 
6
 As a robustness, we also checked whether the probability of Followers’ disclosure is positively associated with the 
number of peer write-offs in the preceding six month and obtained qualitatively similar results. 
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Finally, to provide direct evidence that the Followers’ write-offs are both excessive and 
strategic (yielding a future benefit), we use hand-collected data on reversals of restructuring 
charges from the 10-K reports of all Leaders and Followers for the write-off year and two years 
thereafter. Our comprehensive data collection process (detailed in the Appendix), which involves 
reading firms’ notes to financial statements rather than simply mechanically searching for terms 
such as “reversal”, enables us to analyze the complete set of reversals of restructuring charges for 
all firms in our sample. We show that during the two-year period after the write-off, Followers 
reverse restructuring charges significantly more frequently than Leaders. More importantly, these 
reversals tend to coincide with Followers’ meeting analyst forecasts that would otherwise not be 
met, indicating an immediate benefit of the reversals. Overall, our empirical results support the 
mechanism of big bath herding arising as an optimal strategy for firms who take advantage of the 
clustered negative news to create reserves for future use. 
Our study makes three contributions to the extant literature. First, we contribute to the 
growing managerial herding literature by demonstrating that firms strategically over-report bad 
news. While prior studies theoretically (Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer 2011) and empirically 
(Tse and Tucker 2009; Bratten et al. 2016) show that the release of negative information tends to 
be clustered because firms strategically time the release of information, the strategic over-
reporting of negative information has not been discussed or documented. Our finding of strategic 
over-reporting of unfavorable information can be further applied to a variety of events such as 
accounting restatements, earnings warnings, and missing various accounting benchmarks.  
Second, we address an important unanswered question: why do firms herd, what kind of 
real costs do they save, and what real benefits do they gain by herding? While the existing 
literature offers some conjectures about why firms herd, such as to reduce blame for earnings 
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warnings or restatements, it does not present empirical evidence of real benefits associated with 
herding. Our paper demonstrates that firms benefit from herding by first over-stating bad news 
and later reversing discretionary charges to report better future performance, since the excessive 
reporting of bad news in a cluster induces a more mild negative stock price reaction. We use a 
unique and comprehensive sample of reversals of restructuring charges to demonstrate that 
clustered write-offs are associated with a higher frequency of future strategic reversals, which 
help meet analysts’ benchmarks that otherwise would not be met. 
Third, this paper provides a multi-firm perspective on big bath reporting behavior, 
therefore extending the scope of prior research, which mainly considers big bath behavior from 
the perspective of a standalone firm (Moore 1973, Healy 1985, Strong and Meyer 1987, Francis 
et al. 1996, Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002, Riedl 2004, Dechow and Ge 2006). We provide 
new empirical evidence of big bath herding and demonstrate that the big bath strategy can arise 
as an optimal response to other firms’ reporting choices, i.e., it can have a multi-firm nature.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our research methodology. Section 5 describes 
our empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Prior research and hypothesis development 
Our study is motivated by the academic literature’s interest in managers’ financial reporting 
decisions of negative news. Most prior literature on disclosure suggests that firms tend to delay 
the release of bad news when negative events happen in isolation (Dye 1990; Dye and Sridhar 
1995; Genotte and Trueman 1996). However, Acharya et al. (2011) present a model showing that 
when a negative economic shock affects the entire economy or industry, firms choose to 
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promptly release their bad news. This immediate release of bad news leads to clustered reporting 
in bad times. While the clustered reporting of bad news is not surprising, as firms’ performance 
is correlated and affected by market and industry conditions, Acharya et al. underscore the 
strategic nature of timing of bad news announcements. They also show that, in contrast, good 
news does not exhibit clustering.  
Analytical predictions in Acharya et al. (2011) are supported by recent empirical studies. 
Tse and Tucker (2010) examine earnings warnings using duration analysis and find evidence of 
warning clustering, suggesting that managers herd and time their warnings to occur soon after 
their peers’ warnings. They hypothesize that managers time their warnings to cluster with their 
peers to reduce their apparent responsibility when other firms also issue bad news. Myers et al. 
(2013) extend the bad news clustering literature by showing that industry peers influence firms’ 
decisions to disclose restatement news in Form 8-K filings, rather than in amended or periodic 
filings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Bratten et al. (2016) examine how the 
reported performance of a leader (defined as a larger firm within an industry that is the first to 
announce earnings) affects the discretionary reporting of followers (the remaining firms in the 
same industry that announce earnings after the leader). They find evidence that if a leader falls 
short of the earnings forecast from financial analysts forecast, followers report lower 
discretionary accruals and are more likely to miss analysts’ expectations as well. Such reporting 
behavior is consistent with bad news herding, where followers strategically use discretion to 
flock with the leader when the leader reports bad news. Evidence of good news herding, where 
followers are more likely to use discretion and meet analysts’ expectations when the leader 
reports good news, are more limited, which is consistent with Acharya et al. (2011), who predict 
bad news herding, but not good news herding.  
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While the above papers document bad news herding in different settings, they assume 
that managers herd to reduce personal responsibility or to gain future benefits. However, they do 
not provide evidence that managers indeed succeed in achieving these goals. Our main 
motivation is to take the next step in understanding the mechanism behind bad news herding and 
the benefits this strategy can bring. Focusing on firms’ write-offs decisions during recessions, we 
simultaneously address three research questions: 1) Do firms herd and strategically time their 
write-offs to occur soon after their peer firms’ write-offs? 2) Do herding firms undertake a big 
bath by over-reporting their write-offs? 3) Do firms gain future benefits from big bath herding?  
Write-offs provide an interesting and meaningful setting for studying managerial strategic 
timing for three reasons. First, write-offs are significant and highly visible. Second, current 
accounting rules create a semi-mandatory reporting environment. On the one hand, GAAP 
stipulates that firms must write-down most non-financial assets when their fair values drop 
sufficiently below their carrying values. On the other hand, managers exercise significant 
discretion over the timing and the extent of write-offs because of the subjectivity of fair value 
determination and auditors’ and regulators’ difficulty in verifying fair value estimates. Third, 
excessive write-offs efficiently transfer future expenses into the current period and create 
accounting reserves, which can be released in future periods to report better performance. These 
future benefits of created reserves provide managers with incentives to engage in excessive 
write-offs. Thus, in addition to strategic timing of write-offs as theoretically predicted by 
Acharya et al. (2011), write-offs facilitate an investigation of whether and why firms engage in 
strategic over-reporting of bad news.  
Our first task is to establish whether bad news herding is applicable to large write-offs 
reporting. Bad news herding is supported by the rational information transfer as well as 
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behavioral biases documented in psychology and behavioral finance. From the information 
transfer perspective, Acharya et al. (2011) predict that an external event, such as peers’ write-
offs in our setting, may reduce investors’ estimate of a firm’s earnings. This lowers the 
equilibrium disclosure threshold causing the immediate release of some previously withheld bad 
news, resulting in clustering. From the behavioral perspective, covariation theory and contrast 
effects also point towards incentives to cluster bad news disclosures. The covariation theory 
predicts that evaluators attribute the agent’s behavior to external factors when other agents 
exhibit similar behavior (Koonce and Mercer, 2005). Since managers are concerned with 
investors’ perception of their ability, they have incentives to minimize their responsibility for 
write-offs by herding with other firms. For example, motivated by the covariation theory, Tse 
and Tucker (2010) document that managers herd in earnings warnings to minimize their apparent 
responsibility for earnings shortfalls. Additionally, the contrast effects theory shows people often 
interpret information by contrasting it with what they have observed recently. Psychologists 
provide extensive evidence of contrast effect biases ranging from the interpretations of physical 
dimensions such as weight, length of lines, and shape (Heintz 1950; Sherif, Taub, and Hovland 
1958; Krantz and Campbell 1961) and social attributes such as personality impressions (Simpson 
and Ostrom 1976), criminal acts (Pepitone and DiNubile 1976), and physical attractiveness 
(Kenrick and Gutierres 1980), to earnings announcements (Hartzmark and Shue 2017). For 
example, Hartzmark and Shue (2017) present evidence that contrast effects can distort prices in 
sophisticated and liquid market. They find that investors mistakenly perceive earnings news 
today as more impressive if yesterday’s earnings surprise was bad and less impressive if 
yesterday’s surprise was good, and demonstrate that contrast effects cannot be explained by the 
information transfer. In our setting, contrast effects theory predicts that if managers are 
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concerned with the market reaction on the reported bad news, they would be inclined to report 
their write-offs immediately following peers’ write-offs to minimize the market’s negative 
response. Collectively, information transfer and social-phycology channels suggest that after 
observing Leaders’ reporting write-offs Followers will accelerate the timing of their write-offs. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis predicts: 
Hypothesis 1:  A Follower’s likelihood of reporting write-offs increases with the number 
of peer firms that have reported write-offs in the previous periods. 
 
Next, we establish a link between the market reactions to clustered news (Followers’ 
reports) vs. standalone news (Leaders’ report). Several features of human behavior documented 
in social psychology and behavioral finance explain a lowered market response to clustered 
news. First, concurrent announcements create investor distraction, which leads to muted market 
reactions. For example, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) document the effect of distraction when multiple 
firms release their earnings announcements contemporaneously. Investors’ distraction is 
extensively documented in various settings such as Friday earnings announcements (DellaVigna 
and Pollet 2009), March Madness (Drake, Gee, and Thornock 2015), and competing earnings 
announcements (Frederickson and Zolotoy 2016), among many others. In our setting, distraction 
predicts muted market responses to the Follower’ negative reports, which are issued in clusters. 
Second, when a piece of bad news follows other bad news, it is perceived as less negative due to 
contrast effects (Pepitone and DiNubile 1976; Kenrick and Gutierres 1980; Hartzmark and Shue 
2017). In our setting, contrast effects predict that Followers’ bad news is perceived as less 
negative when juxtaposed with bad news reported by Leaders. Third, the covariation theory 
posits that multiple similar outcomes across different entities are less likely to be attributed to 
individual entities than standalone outcomes (Kelley 1967; Koonce and Mercer 2005). In our 
setting, covariation theory predicts that investors draw less inference about Follower firms from 
11 
 
their clustered announcements. These features of human behavior allude to a muted market 
reaction to clustered write-offs compared to standalone write-offs. Therefore, we expect different 
stock price sensitivity to write-offs reported by Leaders and Followers and state our second 
empirical hypothesis in the following form: 
Hypothesis 2:  Stock prices are less sensitive to the magnitude of Followers’ write-offs 
than to those of Leaders. 
 
An asymmetric price reaction to Leaders’ standalone write-offs and Followers’ clustered 
write-offs enables Followers to exploit the muted market response to their write-offs by engaging 
in excessive write-offs and create accounting reserves. These accounting reserves can be used in 
the future to report better performance. In contrast, the high sensitivity of stock prices to 
standalone write-offs discourages Leaders from reporting excessive write-offs, as any additional 
amount of write-off would result in significantly lower stock prices. Ideally, to test the 
excessiveness of Followers’ write-offs, we would measure the “normal” and “excessive” 
portions of write-offs. However, difficulty in reliably measuring changes in the fundamental 
asset values, especially during negative economic shocks, would introduce noise into any 
proposed expectation model. To overcome this limitation, we contrast post write-off 
performance of Followers, who report excessive write-offs as they take advantage of a muted 
market reaction on clustered reports, to Leaders, who report proper write-offs because of the 
strong negative market reaction to their standalone write-offs. Specifically, first, as an indirect 
test, we examine post write-off earnings and cash flows of Leaders and Followers. Next, as a 
direct test, we analyze the reversals of restructuring charges. 
Thus, our third set of empirical hypotheses follows from the differential impact of the 
excessive and proper write-offs on firms’ future accounting reporting. By reporting an excessive 
write-off, a firm efficiently shifts its future expenses into the current period (Elliott and Hanna 
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1996, Burgstahler, Jiambalvo, and Shevlin 2002, Dechow and Ge 2006). Confirming this, the 
literature finds a positive association between negative special items and future performance, 
attributing this - at least partially - to the accelerated and excessive expense recognition (Moehrle 
2002; Atiase, Platt and Tse 2004; Cready, Lopez, and Sisneros 2012). Alternatively, an 
improvement in future performance can be caused by real business decisions. To distinguish 
between these explanations, literature uses accounting measures with varying reliance on 
accruals (Atiase et al. 2004, Cready et al. 2012). For example, while bottom-line GAAP income, 
which includes all accrual accounting items, will reflect the release of accounting reserves, 
operating cash flows, which are accrual free, will not be affected by the expense shifting. We use 
this feature of accrual earnings and cash flows to differentiate between truthful and excessive 
write-offs of Leaders and Followers. Ceteris paribus, if Followers shift future expenses by 
overstating their write-offs, their future operating performance measured by bottom-line 
accounting earnings will be higher than that of the Leaders, while their future cash flows will not 
be different from those of the Leaders. This reasoning leads to our third set of empirical 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a:  Followers experience better future performance as measured by bottom-
line GAAP accounting earnings than do Leaders. 
 
Hypothesis 3b:  Followers’ future performance as measured by operating cash flows is 
not different from that of Leaders. 
 
While different post write-off performance of Leaders and Followers provides indirect 
evidence of the excessiveness of Followers’ write-offs, analysis of post-write-offs reversals of 
restructuring charges would provide more direct evidence. Restructuring is a “program that is 
planned and controlled by management, and materially changes either the scope of a business 
undertaken by an entity, or the manner in which that business is conducted, as defined by the 
13 
 
International Accounting Standard No. 37 in 2002” (ASC 420-10-20). While restructuring 
charges are a result of a firm’s overall investment strategy, managers still have substantial 
discretion regarding the amount and timing of restructuring charges, because restructuring 
charges usually include estimates of future costs, which can be ambiguous. If a firm overstates 
restructuring charges, it creates hidden balance sheet reserves that can be reversed in the future 
periods to increase future earnings. Moehrle (2002) demonstrates that companies reverse a 
portion of restructuring charge accruals in future quarters in order to beat analysts’ earnings 
forecasts or avoid reporting net losses. Detailed examination of restructuring charge reversals 
enables a direct test of managers’ use of excessive restructuring charges to enhance future 
earnings. Such a test is based on an observable transaction (i.e., a restructuring charge reversal) 
rather than on noisy estimates of earnings management (i.e., discretionary accruals). If Followers 
take excessive write-offs to utilize them in future periods, we expect to find more evidence of 
reversals of restructuring charges for Followers than for Leaders. Therefore, we state our fourth 
hypothesis in the following form: 
Hypothesis 4:  Followers reverse restructuring charges more frequently than Leaders in 
the period following the write-off. 
 
Prior studies suggest that meeting analyst forecasts is among the most important 
incentives for managing earnings (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 
2004). A release of reserves created by excessive write-offs, such as a reversal of prior 
restructuring charges, helps meet earnings targets (Moehrle 2002). Therefore, if Followers 
indeed take a big bath by shifting future period expenses to the current period write-offs, we 
expect that Followers will have a higher likelihood of meeting analysts’ expectations compared 
to Leaders in the periods after the write-offs. Furthermore, the release of accounting reserves 
created by the excessive write-offs can help meet earnings benchmarks when these benchmarks 
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otherwise would not be met. Therefore, if Followers report excessive write-offs, we expect that 
reversals of restructuring charges helps Followers meet analysts’ earnings benchmarks more 
often than Leaders. Thus, we state our fifth hypothesis in the following form: 
Hypothesis 5:  Followers’ reversals of restructuring charges are associated with higher 
probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts in periods following the write-offs than that of 
Leaders. 
 
3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
We use two major negative economic shocks that have affected a wide range of industries — the 
2001 recession of the dot-com crash and the 2008 recession associated with the financial crisis 
— to test our empirical hypotheses. NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee maintains a 
chronology of the U.S. business cycles.
7
 The recession of 2001 lasted from March 2001 to 
November 2001, while the recession of 2008 lasted from December 2007 to June 2009. These 
recessions provide a good setting to test our hypothesis because 1) they affected almost all 
industries in the economy and 2) they were strong enough to trigger write-offs.  
Beginning with 2000, COMPUSTAT provides a breakdown of the largely ambiguous 
category “Special Items” into items related to (i) Acquisition/Merger, (ii) Gain/Loss on Sale of 
Assets, (iii) Impairment of Goodwill, (iv) Settlement (Litigation/Insurance), (v) Restructuring 
Costs, (vi) Writedowns, (vii) Extinguishment of Debt, (viii) In-Process Research & 
Development, and (ix) other Special Items. Managers have differential discretion regarding the 
timing and amount of different types of special items. For example, managers have little 
discretion over reporting losses from legal/insurance settlements or extinguishment of debt, 
because the timing of events that trigger these items is often controlled by an outside party. We 
believe that write-downs, restructuring charges, and goodwill impairments are best suited for 
                                                 
7
 See announcements from the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee: http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
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testing managerial discretion over reporting strategies.
8
 We take advantage of the expanded 
COMPUSTAT reporting on categories of special items and define a write-off event as any 
quarter observation for which the sum of pre-tax “write-downs” (COMPUSTAT item WDP), 
“restructuring costs” (COMPUSTAT item RCP), and “impairment of goodwill” (COMPUSTAT 
item GDWLIP) exceeds one percent of the lagged firm total assets.
 
 
The first step in our sample selection is to identify write-off firm-quarter observations 
that have earnings announcements during the period starting 3 months before and ending 18 
months after the beginning of the recession and that have non-missing financial data necessary 
for our analysis.
9
 The starting and ending points of the sample are heuristic and motivated by the 
observed higher frequency of write-offs during the recession. We chose to start 3 months before 
the beginning of the recession, as determined by NBER, to capture the reporting of the 
bellwether industries or firms. Prior literature shows that certain industries or firms that are 
characterized by high interconnectedness with their direct suppliers/customers and/or indirect 
chains of downstream sectors may originate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks 
(Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz‐Salehi 2012; Bonsall, Bozanic, and Fischer 2013; 
Ahern and Harford 2014; Aobdia, Caskey, and Ozel 2014), and thus these industries/firms may 
write-off assets even before the beginning of the recession. 
                                                 
8
 The recession of 2001 falls into the transitional period from the long-accepted practice of amortization of goodwill 
acquired in business combinations under SFAS 121, “Accounting for impairment of long-lived assets”, to SFAS 
142, “Goodwill and other intangible assets”, which instead requires companies to periodically review goodwill for 
impairment and to recognize a loss if goodwill is impaired. For robustness, we exclude goodwill impairment from 
our write-off sample, and define a write-off event as any quarter observation for which the sum of pre-tax “write-
downs” (COMPUSTAT item WDP), and “restructuring costs” (COMPUSTAT item RCP) exceeds one percent of 
the lagged firm total assets. All results hold for a sample of write-offs that excludes goodwill impairments. 
9
 We require the presence of the following variables: total assets, shareholders’ equity, market value of equity, sales, 
net income, operating cash flows, operating earnings, and CEO’s name in the year preceding the write-off year and 
the write-off year itself, monthly stock returns during the year preceding the write-off, and daily stock returns over 
[0; +3] days relative to the earnings announcement. 
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We identified 1118 firm-quarter observations with write-offs in the first step. Second, 
following prior literature, we eliminate financial firms and firms in gas, oil, and utilities 
industries because these firms have a different regulatory environment (Francis et al. 1996; Riedl 
2004; Haggard, Howe, and Lynch 2015). Specifically, we exclude observations in industries with 
codes 30 (Petroleum and Natural Gas), 31 (Utilities), 45 (Banking), 46 (Insurance), 47 (Real 
Estate), 48 (Trading), and 49 (Almost Nothing) of Fama and French’s (1993) 49-industry 
classification and retain 1039 firm-quarter observations. 
Third, because our goal is to study how the timing and magnitude of a firm’s write-off is 
affected by its peers, we retain only the first firm-quarter write-off reported during the sample 
period. Any write-offs that are subsequent to a firm’s first write-off might be influenced by its 
own financial situation and market reaction to its previously announced write-off. After this step, 
we retain 694 firm-quarter observations. 
Fourth, we require that each industry must have at least three write-offs per recession, 
and we delete 24 events that fail to satisfy this requirement. Fifth, we define a “Leader” as any 
firm that has a write-off during the period starting 3 months before and ending 3 months after the 
beginning of the recession and a “Follower” as any firm that has a write-off during our sample 
period starting 4 months after the beginning of the recession. We excluded industries for which 
we did not observe write-offs during the Leaders’ period ([-3; +3] months relative to the 
beginning of recession). This brings us to our final “write-off” sample of 589 firms. Table 1 
summarizes our sample selection process. 
We perform several robustness tests to examine alternative specifications for Leaders and 
Followers. First, to alleviate concerns that our results are affected by the timing of the fiscal 
year-end we repeat our analysis on the sample of firms that have only a December fiscal year-
17 
 
end. Second, we define Leaders as firms with write-offs in the 3-month period after the 
beginning of the recession, i.e., we exclude pre-recession months. Third, we limit the timing of 
Followers’ write-offs to the one-year period after the Leaders’ write-offs. All results hold for 
these alternative specifications. 
Our stock return data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices’ (CRSP) 
monthly returns database. We extract financial statement data and other company information 
from the Merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT database and obtain analyst coverage from the I/B/E/S 
database (both its detailed and summary history files) for each stock in our sample, using 
historical CUSIP codes to link these two databases. We define the number of analysts covering a 
stock as the number of unique analysts issuing earnings per share (EPS) forecasts during a 
calendar year. 
We hand-collect the instances of restructuring charge reversals by gathering 10-K reports 
for all of the companies in our sample for three fiscal years after the event quarter from the Edgar 
reporting portal of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
10
 Out of 589 firms in our sample, 
we were able to obtain 10-K reports for 583, 576, and 554 firms for the first, second, and third 
fiscal years after the write-off quarter, respectively. Specifically, we read the sections of the 
“Notes to Financial Statements” in the 10-K reports that describe the reporting of restructuring 
activities and record whether a firm fully or partially reversed previously accrued restructuring 
charges.
11
 In Appendix, we provide detailed examples of firms’ reporting practices for reversals 
of restructuring charges.  
                                                 
10
 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
11
 We do not use a simple keyword search to find the reversals of restructuring charges, but instead read the 
corresponding notes to financial statements because firms report reversals in various forms. While firms sometimes 
use the words “reverse” or “reversal”, they often report a negative “change in estimates”, or a negative non-cash 
adjustment to a restructuring accrual account. By actually reading all of the corresponding notes, we are able to 1) 
collect data on restructuring charge reversals for a larger number of companies and 2) have a more precise data set. 
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Table 2, Panel A displays the frequency and amount of write-offs by industry and 
recession. Electronic Equipment, Computer Software, Business Services, and Wholesale 
industries have the largest numbers of write-offs in the 2001 recession (47, 31, 20, and 20, 
respectively). Similarly, Electronic Equipment, Business Services, Retail, Wholesale, and 
Computer Software industries have the most write-offs in the 2008 recession (45, 36, 24, 21, and 
21, respectively). The higher frequency of write-offs in these industries might be explained by 
the relatively greater number of firms operating in them. For most of the industries, the Leader 
group consists of 1-3 firms. 
Table 2, Panel B summarizes the frequency of write-offs relative to the recession peak for 
all firms in our sample. The first two months after the beginning of the recession have the highest 
frequency of write-off reporting (45 and 37 observations, respectively). Figure 2 graphically 
summarizes the frequency of Leaders’ and Followers’ write-offs relative to the beginning of the 
recession. Roughly 65% of all write-offs happen during the first year. 
We summarize the characteristics of Leaders and Followers in Table 3. Leaders are 
somewhat larger in size than Followers but have a lower mean book-to-market ratio than 
Followers, suggesting that large growing firms tend to lead the write-offs triggered by the 
recession. The median changes in return on assets (ROA) from years -5 to -1 prior to the write-
off are significantly more negative for Leaders than for Followers (the median difference is -
0.003). This is consistent with our prediction that Leaders’ write-offs come in response to the 
decline in their operating performance, while Followers’ write-offs are not driven by their weak 
performance but rather by strategic timing of the write-offs. Similarly, the mean and median 
cumulative abnormal returns computed over the year preceding the write-off are significantly 
more negative for Leaders than for Followers (the mean difference is -0.138, and the median 
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difference is -0.171). Finally, the return synchronicity, measured as the 𝑅2 of a firm’s weekly 
stock returns on the value-weighted market returns and industry returns in the calendar year 
before the event quarter, is higher for Followers than for Leaders, suggesting that Followers’ 
stock prices are more sensitive to the price movement of their peer firms than that of the Leaders. 
Overall, from Table 3, we can observe that only Leaders exhibit a significant decline in operating 
and stock performance in the years before the write-offs, while Followers show no sign of a 
performance deterioration, but their stock prices are more sensitive to their peers’ returns. 
 
4. Methodology  
Herding 
We use duration analysis to test our empirical Hypothesis 1 that Followers time their write-offs 
to occur soon after industry peers’ write-offs. Specifically, we estimate whether the probability 
of firm i reporting a write-off, given that firm i has not reported any write-offs since the 
beginning of the sample period, is affected by the incidence of its industry peers’ write-offs. To 
test our Hypothesis 1, we use the Cox proportional hazard model in the following specification
12
: 
 
ℎ (𝑡𝑖) = ℎ0(𝑡𝑖)(𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝑎3∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖
+ 𝑎5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎6𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎7𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝑎8𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖) 
(1) 
where, dependent variable ℎ(𝑡𝑖) is the hazard function of a write-off at time t. Variable t 
indicates the number of days from the beginning of the recession to the earnings announcement 
day for the quarter when a firm reports a write-off.
13
 The Cox model generalizes a proportional 
hazard model by allowing the distribution of the baseline hazard function, ℎ0(𝑡𝑖), to take any 
                                                 
12
 To insure robustness of our duration analysis, we also use general piecewise log-logistic model as an alternative 
specification and obtained even stronger results. These results are not tabulated due to a space constrains, but are 
available upon request. 
13
 We consider the write-off to be large if the sum of the write-down, restructuring charges and goodwill impairment 
(COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GDWLIP) exceeds one percent of lagged total assets. 
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form. Our primary variable of interest is 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖, measured as the number of write-offs 
reported by industry peers in the three-month period preceding firm i’s write-off.14 If a 
manager’s decision to write-off the assets is accelerated by peers’ write-offs, the coefficient on 
𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖 should be positive. Alternatively, if a manager’s decision is unrelated to peers’ 
write-offs, the coefficient estimate is expected to be insignificantly different from zero.  
We include three sets of control variables that are identified in prior literature as being 
associated with firms’ decisions to write-off assets (Francis et al. 1996, Reidl 2004). The first set 
of variables captures economic conditions that affect firm i's decision. Specifically, we use the 
magnitude of pre-write-off unexpected earnings (𝑈𝐸𝑖  ), sales growth (∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖), and the 
cumulative abnormal stock return (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖). We define 𝑈𝐸𝑖  as the difference between the latest 
outstanding analyst consensus forecast before the earnings announcement and actual earnings, 
deflated by the firm’s stock price at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event. ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is the 
firm’s sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year. 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is the firm’s 
cumulative abnormal return computed for the year preceding the write-off.  
The next set of control variables reflects a firm’s disclosure environment, litigation 
concerns, and investors’ scrutiny. We include a firm’s market capitalization (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖), measured as 
a natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization at the end of the last fiscal year preceding 
the event, and the market share of the firm’s product in the industry (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖), measured as 
the ratio of the firm’s total sales in the most recent fiscal year before the event to the industry’s 
total sales in that year. 
Our final set of control variables accounts for the synchronicity of a firm i’s earnings and 
stock returns with the industry peers, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖. Firms with fundamentals that are 
                                                 
14
 We also use an alternative specification, which measures the number of large write-offs by industry peers during 
the six months preceding firm i’s write-off, and obtained similar results. 
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highly synchronous with those of their industry peers are more likely to be affected by common 
shocks and thus have a propensity to write-off the assets faster. Following Tse and Tucker (2010) 
and Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), we measure earnings synchronicity (𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖) by the 𝑅
2 of 
the regression of the firm’s return on assets (ROA) on the industry ROA (calculated as the total 
industry earnings divided by the total industry assets) in the 20 quarters before the event quarter. 
Similarly, we calculate stock return synchronicity (𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖) as the 𝑅
2 of the regression of the 
firm’s weekly stock returns on the value-weighted market returns and industry returns in the 
calendar year before the event quarter (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Tse and Tucker 2010). We 
convert all continuous control variables into within-industry-quarter ranking because we are 
interested in examining a firm’s disclosure behavior relative to its industry peers. We rank all 
control variables (𝑈𝐸𝑖, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖) among all firms 
in the industry quarter that are covered by COMPUSTAT and CRSP. 
 
Price Response to the Write-offs of Leaders and Followers 
 
A majority of firms disclose information about large write-downs, restructuring charges, and 
goodwill impairment at the earnings announcements (Francis et al. 1996).
15
 Thus, we test 
Hypothesis 2 by regressing stock returns at the time of earnings announcements on the amount of 
the write-offs, controlling for earnings surprises and other factors that might influence price 
elasticity. In particular, we run an OLS regression in the following form: 
 
𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖  + 𝛾2𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖  + 𝛾3𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛾4𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾6𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾8 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(2) 
                                                 
15
 We search Factiva database for earnings announcements and conference calls for each firm in our sample. We 
confirm that 85% of firms disclosed write-offs at earnings announcements.  
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where 𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is firm i's compounded excess return over days [0, +3] relative to the earnings 
announcement day. Excess return is measured as the difference between the realized return and 
the corresponding size and book-to-market portfolio of firms in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
universe.
16
 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is the sum of the write-down, restructuring charges, and goodwill 
impairment (COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GPWLIP), converted to positive values, and 
deflated by the total assets at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the write-off quarter. 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i is a Follower and zero otherwise. A 
negative coefficient on 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 would indicate that stock returns at the time of the 
announcement react negatively to Leaders’ write-offs. To capture Followers’ and Leaders’ 
differential price sensitivity to write-offs, we interact the size of the write-off, 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖, with 
the 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 dummy. A positive coefficient on this interaction term would indicate that stock 
returns react less negatively per dollar of write-off for Followers than for Leaders. 
To control for other information that is contemporaneously announced, we include the 
earnings surprise adjusted for the write-offs (𝑈𝐸𝑖). We also control for a firm’s market 
capitalization (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖), book-to-market ratio at the end of the fiscal year prior to the write-off 
(𝐵𝑀𝑖), and a firm’s synchronicity of earnings and stock returns with its industry peers, 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖  and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖. The definition of 𝑈𝐸𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖  and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 is provided in 
regression 1. Similarly to regression 1, we convert continuous control variables into within-
industry-quarter ranking. While 𝑈𝐸𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝐵𝑀𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 are ranked among all 
firms in the industry quarter that are covered by COMPUSTAT and CRSP,  𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is 
ranked only among the firms included in our write-off sample.  
 
                                                 
16
 We obtain daily size and book-to-market benchmark portfolio returns from Professor Kenneth R. French’s 
website, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html. 
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Future Performance of Leaders and Followers 
We test empirical Hypotheses 3a and 3b by running the following OLS regression: 
 
∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾2𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟
+  𝛾4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾5∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 + 𝛾6∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡 +  𝛾7∆𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡
+  𝛾8∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 +  +𝛾9𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡 + 𝛾10𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛾110𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾12𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾13𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛾14∆𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡
+  𝛾15𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾16𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖  
(3) 
where dependent variables (∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2)  measure the change in future performance of firm i 
from the event year t to two years after event. We use two performance measures: change in 
industry-adjusted return on equity (∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 ) and change in operating cash flow 
(∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2). We calculate ROA as the ratio of income before extraordinary items 
(COMPUSTAT item IB) to the total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT). We compute CFO as the 
ratio of cash from operations (COMPUSTAT item OANCF) to the total assets. To avoid 
comparison of the performance metrics across different phases of the economic cycle and to 
address a possibility that the mean reversion of firms’ performance is correlated with the 
economic cycle, we adjust all performance measures by the industry-year by subtracting the 
industry median ROA or CFO for the corresponding year.
17
 
Our main variable of interest is 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖. If Followers make excessive write-offs by 
shifting future period expenses into the current period, we expect that their future ROA, which 
encompasses all accrual components, will be higher than that of Leaders, who report write-offs 
truthfully and thus do not have accrual reserves that help achieve better future accounting 
performance. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 when ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 is a 
                                                 
17
 We determine industry based on the two-digit SIC codes. 
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dependent variable. However, we expect that the coefficient on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is insignificantly 
different from zero when ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 is a dependent variable, because these accounting measures 
do not contain accrual components that can be used by managers to release reserves created by 
excessive write-offs. 
We include the write-off amount (𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖) and the interaction term between 
𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 and an indicator variable 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 in the regression. If indeed the excessive 
write-off allows Followers to boost their future earnings, we expect a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term between 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 and 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 when dependent variable is ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2. 
However, we expect that the coefficient on 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is insignificantly different 
from zero when ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 is a dependent variable.  
We control for firm characteristics that prior literature has shown to be correlated with 
the change in future performance. In particular, we include the level and the change of the 
performance measures (𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡  and ∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡), where 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡is either the industry adjusted 
ROA or CFO for the event year, and ∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 is the change in these measures from one year 
before the event year to the event year. A systematic decline in a firm’s performance before the 
write-off, measured as the mean change in the book-to-market ratio (∆𝐵𝑀𝑖) and the return on 
equity (∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡) over the five years preceding the event year, might affect the speed of a 
firm’s recovery from a negative economic shock, and thus we include these as control variables. 
We include a firm’s sales growth (∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡) in the year prior to the event year because a 
trend in sales growth affects future performance. We include industry growth (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖), 
which is computed as the mean change in aggregated industry sales over the five years prior to 
the event year, to control for the effect of the overall industry trend on individual firms. We also 
include financial leverage (𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖), defined as the ratio of total assets (COMPUSTAT item 
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TA) to the book value (COMPUSTAT item CEQ) at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the 
event, and the change in top management (∆𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡), which is defined as an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm experiences a change in the top three executives either in the 
write-off year or in the prior year. Finally, we control for size (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡), the book-to-market ratio 
(𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡), market share (𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1), and the synchronicity of a firm’s earnings and stock 
returns with its industry peers (𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡), which are defined the same way as in 
regressions (1) and (2). 
 
Reversals of restructuring charges  
To test our Hypothesis 4, which states that Followers reverse restructuring charges more often 
than Leaders in the years following the write-offs, we employ the following logistic regression: 
 
Pr(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑁) = 𝐹(𝜂0 +  𝜂1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜂2𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝜂3𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 +
 𝜂4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜂5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝜂6𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜂7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 +  𝜂8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝜂9𝐵𝑀𝑖 +
 𝜂10𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝜂11𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 +  𝜉𝑖)  
(4) 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑁 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i reverses restructuring charges 
in the year N after a write-off, and zero otherwise. We consider two fiscal years after the write-
off, and thus N takes values 1 or 2. Our main explanatory variable is 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖. We expect a 
positive coefficient on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖  if Followers reverse restructuring charge more often than 
Leaders. 
We control for other variables that might influence managerial decisions to partially 
reverse restructuring charges. Moehrle (2002) shows that firms reverse restructuring charges 
more frequently when pre-reversal earnings are below analysts’ earnings forecasts. Thus, to 
control for this incentive, we include 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙, which is an indicator variable that equals one if 
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a firm’s pre-reversal earnings are below consensus analysts’ forecasts and zero otherwise. Pre-
reversal earnings are computed as actual earnings reported on IBES minus reversal amount 
multiplied by statutory tax rate of 40 percent. Other control variables are related to a firm’s 
monitoring environment, litigation concerns, investors’ scrutiny, and the degree of operating 
uncertainty. Specifically, we include a firm’s market capitalization (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖), institutional 
ownership (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖), which is the percent of a firm’s shares outstanding that is held by 
institutions, number of analysts that follow a firm (𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖), and research and development 
intensity (𝑅𝐷𝑖), computed as COMPUSTAT item XRD divided by the total assets at the end of 
the fiscal year before the write-off. R&D intensity serves as a proxy for the firm’s reliance on 
implicit claims with its other stakeholders (e.g., customers, employees, and suppliers) and as an 
indicator of uncertainty in a firm’s future performance. The literature shows that the earnings of 
loss firms are less value relevant for investors. Thus, we proxy the value relevance of earnings by 
the indicator variable 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖, which equals one if firm i reports a negative income before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item IB) in the fiscal year before the event and zero 
otherwise. Additionally, we include the amount of the firm’s write-off, 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖. Similarly 
to the previous regressions, we control for 𝐵𝑀𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖, which are defined the 
same way as in regressions (1) and (2). 
To test our Hypothesis 5, which states that Followers’ reversals of restructuring charges 
are associated with higher probability of meeting analysts’ forecasts in the post write-off periods 
than that of Leaders, we estimate the following logistic regression: 
27 
 
 
Pr(𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑁) = 𝐹(𝜅0 +  𝜅1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝜅2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁 + 𝜅3𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 +   𝜅4𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖
+  𝜅5𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜅6𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜅7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝜅8𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖  + 𝜅9|𝐹𝐸|
+  𝜅10𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝜅11𝐵𝑀𝑖 +  𝜅12𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 +  𝜅13𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖) 
(5) 
where dependent variable, Pr (𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑁 ), is the probability of meeting/beating analysts’ forecast 
of annual earnings in the year N after the write-off. 𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑁 is a dummy variable that equals one 
if firm i's actual earnings reported in year N after the write-off are greater or equal to the latest 
outstanding consensus analysts’ forecast before the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. 
We consider two years after the write-off, and thus N takes the value of 1 or 2. We estimate 
regression (5) twice. First, on a full sample of firms with write-offs, and second on a sample of 
firms that would fail to meet the analysts’ forecast based on pre-reversal earnings. The main 
explanatory variables are 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖, 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁, and the interaction term between 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 
and 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁. A positive coefficient on the interaction term between 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁 and 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 would indicate that Followers are more likely to meet analysts’ forecasts when they 
reverse their restructuring charges. This would provide strong evidence of the strategic over-
reporting of restructuring charges by Followers, who benefit from meeting earnings targets, 
which otherwise would not have been met.  
We control for other variables that might impact managers’ incentives and ability to meet 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Following Matsumoto (2002) we control for the institutional 
ownership (𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖), reliance on implicit claims with other stakeholders, proxied by research and 
development intensity (𝑅𝐷𝑖), value relevance of earnings, proxied by the presence of losses prior 
to write-offs (𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖), and growth prospects, proxied by the book-to-market ratio 𝐵𝑀𝑖. We also 
control for the number of analysts following firm i (𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖) and the uncertainty in forecasting 
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environment, proxied by the absolute forecast error (|𝐹𝐸𝑖|), which is the absolute value of the 
difference between reported earnings and the initial consensus forecast (measured as the first 
forecast each analyst made after the prior quarter earnings announcement), deflated by the stock 
price at the end of the last year before the write-off. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖, 𝑅𝐷𝑖, 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖, 𝐵𝑀𝑖, and 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖 are 
defined the same way as in regression (4). Additionally, we control for 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡, 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖, which are defined in regressions (1) and (2). 
 
5 Empirical Results 
Herding 
Table 4, Panel A provides an intuitive description of the write-off clustering by showing how 
soon Followers disclose a write-off after the most recent peer write-off. We observe that most 
Followers report write-offs within four months after the most recent write-off announcement 
coming from a peer firm (420 write-offs, or 91.50%). For example, the number of firms 
announcing write-offs in the same month as peers is 47 (10.24%), and the number of write-offs 
announced in the following month is 248 (54.03%). The number of firms reporting write-offs 
four months after the most recent peer write-off decreases substantially. For example, only seven 
firms report write-offs in the fifth month. This pattern of reporting is consistent with herding 
behavior. Importantly, Panel A does not show how soon Followers announce after Leaders, but 
rather provides a description that Followers’ write-offs tend to happen together. Leaders’ and 
Followers’ write-offs are well separated in time because we use the absolute timing of the 
recession to define them. 
Panel B presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard model. The estimation uses 
1687 quarterly observations from 459 Followers. The coefficient estimate on 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 
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is positive and significant (0.02), indicating that the probability that a Follower, who has not 
previously reported write-offs, will report a write-off is positively associated with the number of 
peer write-offs in the preceding three months. The effect of 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖  is also 
economically significant. The hazard ratio of 1.04 suggests that the probability that a Follower 
will report write-offs is 4% higher if the number of peers’ recent write-offs increases by one.   
The estimation results of the control variables are as follows. The coefficient estimate on 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is negative and significant, which suggests that the hazard of reporting a write-off has an 
inverse relation with the firm’s cumulative abnormal return in the year prior to the quarter of 
observation. The hazard of reporting write-offs decreases with the product market share, as 
evidenced by negative coefficient on 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖. The coefficients on all other control variables 
are statistically insignificant.  
Overall, the results of the duration analysis support Hypothesis 1, suggesting that a 
Follower’s likelihood of reporting a write-off increases with the number of peer firms that have 
reported write-offs in the previous periods. This is consistent with the herding strategy, which 
predicts that Followers accelerate write-off reporting after observing Leaders, and might report 
write-offs even when they could further postpone such reporting. 
 
Market Reaction 
Table 5 reports estimation results of regression (2) that tests Hypothesis 2 regarding the 
asymmetric market reaction to Leaders’ and Followers’ write-offs. The coefficient estimate on 
𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is significantly negative (-0.154), indicating that overall the market reacts 
negatively to asset write-offs. However, a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
estimate (0.182) on the interaction of 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 with 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 indicates that Followers’ 
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price responses to the write-off amount is less than that of the Leaders. Moreover, the sum of the 
coefficients on 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 and 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 * 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is insignificantly different from 
zero, suggesting that the market does not react to Followers’ write-offs.  
Turning to the control variables, consistent with the prior literature, the price response 
coefficient on earnings surprise, UE, is positive and significant (0.29). The coefficient estimate 
on 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 is negative and significant (-0.028). The coefficient estimates on size, book-to-
market ratio, 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖, and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖  are insignificantly different from zero. Overall, the 
results in Table 5 support Hypothesis 2 that the market reacts less negatively to Followers’ write-
offs than to Leaders’ write-offs. 
 
Future Performance of Leaders and Followers after Write-Offs 
Table 6 reports the results of regression (3), which tests empirical Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
regarding Leaders’ and Followers’ future operating performance after the write-off. In Model 1, 
the dependent variable is the change in a firm’s industry-adjusted ROA over the two years 
following the write-off event (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2). We find that after controlling for other factors 
associated with the future performance, Followers exhibit a greater increase in return on assets 
than Leaders, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient estimate on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖, 
(0.024). The coefficient estimate on 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is negative and statistically significant (-
0.517), while the coefficient estimate on the interaction term between 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is significantly positive (0.191). A negative coefficient on 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 indicates 
that Leaders’ write-offs are negatively related to their future earnings. This is consistent with 
truthful write-off reporting because more severely affected by the economic shock firms have 
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larger write-offs and thus should have worse future performance.
18
 However, a positive 
coefficient on the interaction term between 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 suggests the 
excessiveness of Followers’ write-offs, because excessive write-offs shift future expenses into 
the current period, creating accounting reserves and allowing to boost future earnings 
performance when these reserves are released. Alternatively, a positive coefficient on the 
interaction term can suggest that Followers changed their business strategy and exhibit genuine 
improvement in their performance. However, if Followers’ performance improvement is genuine 
and unrelated to the accrual expense shifting, their future cash flow performance should also 
improve. We test this alternative explanation in Model 2.  
In Models 2, we use the change in a firm’s industry-adjusted cash flows from operating 
activities (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2) over the two years following the write-off event, scaled by the firm’s total 
assets in the last fiscal year preceding the write-off, as dependent variables. In this specification, 
the coefficient estimates on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 and the interaction term between 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 and 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 are insignificantly different from zero, confirming our Hypothesis 3b that Followers 
and Leaders have the same performance with respect to operating cash flows. These findings 
refute the alternative explanation that the boost in Followers’ future earnings is caused by their 
real actions and not by accrual expense shifting. 
The coeﬃcients on the control variables in Table 6 carry the expected signs. Significantly 
negative coefficients on the performance level in the year of the write-off, pre-write-off changes 
in the corresponding performance measures, and sales suggest that a firm’s post-event 
performance is partially explained by its pre-event performance.  
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 For robustness, we also run the regression (3) using an industry-adjusted change in return on equity as a 
dependent variable, and obtained similar results.  
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In summary, the results reported in Table 6 confirm our empirical Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
Faster improvement of future performance measured by GAAP bottom-line earnings of 
Followers, together with marginally similar performances measured by operating cash flows, 
provides circumstantial evidence that Followers strategically report excessive write-offs. Indeed, 
if a firm creates a reserve by transferring future expenses to write-offs, the release of this reserve 
would be reflected in ROA, as it includes all accrual accounting items, such as depreciation and 
amortization and other non-operating expenses, while leaving future cash flows unaffected. 
 
Reversal of Restructuring Charges 
In the previous sections, we provided circumstantial evidence, based on future performance, that 
Followers engage in strategic over-reporting of write-offs. While better future performance of 
Followers in terms of earnings (but not cash flows) suggests that Followers shift future expenses 
by overstating their write-offs, the possibility of an alternative explanation that Followers simply 
improve future performance because of their superior business strategy cannot be completely 
excluded. In this section, we provide direct evidence of the excessiveness of Followers write-offs 
by studying reversals of restructuring charges. If Followers excessively write-off their assets, 
they will reverse their restructuring charges in the future periods. Moreover, the reversals of 
restructuring charges will help them meet earnings benchmarks.  
Panel A, Table 7 presents the univariate analysis of our hand collected sample of 
restructuring charges reversals. Out of 589 firms in our sample, we were able to obtain 10-K 
reports for 583, 576, and 554 firms for the first, second, and third fiscal years after the write-off 
quarter, respectively. We observe that Followers reverse restructuring charges more often than 
Leaders during the two fiscal years after the event. For example, 30.91% of the Followers 
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reverse restructuring charges in the first year after restructuring, while only 14.62% of the 
Leaders do so. In the second year, 30.20% of the Followers but only 21.71% of the Leaders 
reverse their restructuring charges. In the third year, 23.96% of the Followers reverse their 
restructuring charges and 17.46% of the Leaders do so. The difference between the frequencies 
of reversals is significantly different for the two fiscal years after the event, as evidenced by the 
results of the Chi-square test, but the difference between the frequencies in the third year is 
statistically insignificant.  
Panel B presents results of logistic regression (4). The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimate on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 (0.55) demonstrates that even after controlling for 
other factors that can contribute to the decision and ability to reverse restructuring charges, 
Followers reverse restructuring charges more often than Leaders. The coefficient estimate on 
𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is also economically significant: the odds ratio of 2.13 suggests that the odds of 
reversing restructuring charges are 113% higher for Followers than that for Leaders.  
As for the control variables, the coefficient estimate on pre-reversal earnings shortfall, 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖, is positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with prior literature 
finding that firm are more likely to reverse their restructuring charges when they are in danger of 
missing analysts’ forecasts (Moehrle 2002). The size of the firm, which is often serves as a proxy 
of business complexity, and book-to-market ratio, which is a proxy for growth and ultimately 
business uncertainly, are also positively related to the probability of reversal. The number of 
analysts following the firm, 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖, is negatively related to the frequency of reversals, 
suggesting that firms are more cautious in reversing restructuring charges if they face tighter 
investors’ scrutiny. A significantly positive coefficient estimate on 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 (0.44) suggests 
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that a larger write-off or restructuring charge amounts increases the likelihood of firms to reverse 
restructuring charges.
19
  
In Table 8 we test our Hypothesis H5 that Followers meet analysts’ earnings forecast 
more often when they reverse restructuring charges. Model 1 tests our baseline prediction that 
Followers are more likely than Leaders to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts. The estimation uses all 
1065 firm-year observations with available data for two fiscal years after the write-off. We report 
z-statistics based on the clustered by firm and year standard errors. Our results confirm that 
Followers are more likely than Leaders to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts in the two fiscal years 
after write-offs, as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient of 0.395 on 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖. 
This effect is also economically significant – the odds ratio of 1.48 indicates that the odds of 
meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts are 48 percent higher for a Follower than for a Leader.  
In Model 2 we further investigate whether reversals of restructuring charges indeed help 
Followers meet analysts’ expectations when these benchmarks otherwise would not be met.  We 
estimate Model 2 on the sample of 435 firm-year observations, which represents a subsample of 
the full sample used in Model 1 with an additional requirement that firms would fail to meet the 
analysts’ forecast based on pre-reversal earnings. Similarly to Model 1, we report z-statistics 
based on clustered by firm and year standard errors. The insignificantly different from zero 
coefficient estimate on 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁 indicates that Leaders are unable to meet analysts’ 
expectations even when they reverse restructuring charges,  suggesting that Leaders’ reversals 
are more likely caused by managers’ estimation errors. The coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑁 and 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is positive and significant (1.232), which 
                                                 
19
 Our untabulated analysis shows that approximately 75% of 589 firms in our sample report restructuring charges 
(76.92% of Leaders and 74.51% of Followers). The frequency of restructuring charges reported by Leaders and 
Followers is statistically the same. Thus, our results are not driven by the dominance of restructuring charges among 
Leaders or Followers. 
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provides evidence that when Followers reverse restructuring charges they are more likely to meet 
analysts’ benchmarks than Leaders. The positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests that 
Followers are indeed more likely than Leaders to be involved in the strategic over-reporting of 
restructuring charges in the first place and subsequent reversals of these charges to meet earnings 
benchmarks. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are largely consistent with prior 
literature. For example, the coefficient estimates on 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is positive and significant, suggesting 
that larger firms are more likely to meet or exceed expectations (Matsumoto 2002). The negative 
coefficients on  𝐵𝑀𝑖, and 𝐹𝐸𝑖 indicate that growth firms and firms with higher uncertainty in the 
forecasting environment are less likely to meet the forecasts. 
 Collectively, Table 8 provides direct compelling evidence that Followers strategically 
over-report write-offs to create accounting reserves and release them in the subsequent periods to 
meet the market expectations.  
 
6 Summary and conclusion 
In this paper, we demonstrate that bad news herding can be accompanied by over-reporting of 
bad news. Focusing on write-offs during two major recessions of 2001 and 2008, we document 
that firms strategically herd to report their write-offs following large write-offs reported by peer 
firms. Clustering of write-offs can be unsurprising given that economic shock affects almost all 
firms in the economy. However, the strategic nature of this clustered reporting is revealed by the 
excessiveness of write-offs (i.e., big bath strategy by clustered firms), which are subsequently 
partially reversed. We demonstrate this by using a hand-collected sample of reversals of 
restructuring charges. Our results reveal that reversals help herding firms meet analysts’ 
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benchmarks that otherwise would not be met. While prior studies only imply that bad news 
herding is a beneficial strategy, we explain the mechanism behind the herding: we show that 
herding firms gain future benefits by initially over-reporting bad news, and later reporting better 
future performance by employing expense shifting. 
Our study adds a multi-firm perspective to the big bath literature, extending the 
traditional standalone firm approach. We provide new empirical evidence that the big bath 
strategy can arise not only as a response to standalone firm-level events such as management’s 
turnover or bad performance, but also as an optimal response to other firms’ reporting choices. 
Although we focus on the strategic write-off herding behavior, our findings on the over-reporting 
of bad news can also be applied to other settings in which firms can strategically time their 
disclosures to herd with other firms, e.g., restatements, earnings warnings, and meeting various 
accounting benchmarks. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In this Appendix, we explain how we collect the data set for the reversal of restructuring charges. First, 
for each firm in our write-off sample, we obtain 10-K reports from the Edgar reporting portal of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for the three fiscal years after the write-off quarter by searching for 
firms' names and their CIK identifiers as reported in the COMPUSTAT database. Out of 589 firms in our 
sample, we were able to obtain 10-K reports for 583, 576, and 554 firms for the first, second, and third 
fiscal years, respectively, after the write-off quarter. Next, to identify whether a firm reversed its 
restructuring charges, we read sections of the “Notes to Financial Statements” in the 10-Ks that describe 
the reporting of restructuring activities. Firms’ reporting practices for restructuring charge reversals vary 
considerably. Some firms state that they reversed the previously recorded accrual of restructuring charges 
(keywords “reversal” or “reversed”), while other firms report a negative non-cash adjustment to the 
restructuring charge accrual as a result of a change in accounting estimates or a reduction in the estimated 
costs (key words “adjustment”, “non-cash adjustment”, or “reduction”). The following table below 
provides five representative examples of firms’ reporting practices. In Examples 1-3, firms explicitly 
stated that they reversed restructuring reserves that were no longer required. In Example 4, Payless 
Shoesource, Inc. reported a negative non-cash adjustment to its restructuring accrual in tabular form and 
stated in the table description that it incurred a non-recurring benefit as the result of lower than 
anticipated costs associated with the restructuring. In Example 5, E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and 
Company also did not use the words “reversal” or “reversed”, but merely stated that it recorded a 
reduction in the estimated costs associated with the restructuring program. 
 
Example 1: Excerpt from Notes to Financial Statement of International Paper Company for the fiscal 
year ended December 31, 2002   
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51434/000095011703000884/a34643.txt 
NOTE 6 SPECIAL ITEMS INCLUDING RESTRUCTURING AND BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT 
ACTIONS 
Restructuring and Other Charges: 2002: During 2002, restructuring and other charges before taxes and 
minority interest of $695 million ($435 million after taxes and minority interest) were recorded. These 
charges included a $199 million charge before taxes and minority interest ($130 million after taxes and 
minority interest) for asset shutdowns of excess internal capacity and cost reduction actions, a $450 
million pre-tax charge ($278 million after taxes) for additional exterior siding legal reserves discussed in 
Note 11, and a charge of $46 million before taxes and minority interest ($27 million after taxes and 
minority interest) for early debt retirement costs discussed in Note 13. In addition, a $68 million pre-tax 
credit ($43 million after taxes) was recorded in 2002, including $45 million for the reversal of 2001 
and 2000 reserves no longer required and $23 million for the reversal of excess Champion purchase 
accounting reserves. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
 
Example 2: Excerpt from Notes to Financial Statement of Axiom Corporation for the fiscal year ended 
March 31, 2009 
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/733269/000073326909000013/f10k09.htm 
2. RESTRUCTURING, IMPAIRMENT AND OTHER CHARGES (continued): 
Spain Closure in fiscal 2007, the Company announced plans to shut down its operations in Spain. Upon 
the completion of this closure, the Company recorded $6.6 million of exit costs. During fiscal 2008 the 
Company reversed $2.4 million of the accrual, offset by $0.8 million in currency translation 
expenses. In fiscal 2009 $0.4 million in currency translation income was recorded. As of March 31, 2009, 
$0.5 million remained accrued for estimated data protection claims. 
(Emphasis added) 
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Example 3: Excerpt from Notes to Financial Statement of Genesco Inc. for the fiscal year ended January 
31, 2004  
URL: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18498/000095014404003909/g88468e10vk.htm 
Note 2 Restructuring Charges and Discontinued Operations, Continued Nautica Footwear License 
Cancellation The Company ended its license to market footwear under the Nautica label, effective 
January 31, 2001. The Company’s net sales for Fiscal 2002 included $6.1 million of sales of Nautica’s 
branded footwear to fill existing customer orders and sell existing inventory. 
During the second quarter of Fiscal 2002, the Company recorded a restructuring gain of $0.3 million in 
connection with the successful completion of activities related to the Nautica Footwear license 
agreement’s termination. The gain included a $0.1 million reversal of the earlier inventory write-
down, because the Company was able to liquidate its Nautica Footwear inventories at better prices 
than it initially expected. The reversal is reflected in gross margin on the income statement. 
The Nautica footwear business contributed sales of approximately $6.1 million and an operating loss of 
$0.6 million in Fiscal 2002. 
 
(Emphasis added) 
 
 
Example 4: Excerpt from Notes to Financial Statement of Payless Shoesource, Inc. for the fiscal year 
ended January 31, 2004  
URL:https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1060232/000095013704002667/c84303e10vk.htm\#111 
The table below presents the activity of the $41.4 million reserve established as part of the 2001 non-
recurring charge and the status of the reserve as of January 31, 2004. Costs were charged against the 
reserves as incurred. Reserves were reviewed for adequacy on a periodic basis and were adjusted as 
appropriate based on those reviews. 
 
 
We substantially completed our restructuring in 2002. During 2003 we recorded a non-recurring 
benefit of $1.8 million as a result of lower than anticipated costs associated with the restructuring. 
During 2002, we recorded a net non-recurring benefit, resulting from lower than anticipated net 
costs associated with our restructuring recorded in 2001. In 2002, we recorded an additional charge 
of $2.0 million for professional fees and $1.4 million for relocation costs associated with 
implementing the restructuring that was announced during the fourth quarter of 2001. These 
additional costs are reflected in the accompanying consolidated statement of earnings as non-recurring 
charges. Also, during 2002, we decreased our reserve for store closings by $8.0 million, inventory 
liquidations by $2.0 million and increased our reserve for division closings by $1.8 million. This net 
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reversal is reflected in the accompanying consolidated statement of earnings as non-recurring 
benefits. 
(Emphasis added) 
 
 
Example 5: Excerpt from Notes to Financial Statement of E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS AND 
COMPANY for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010  
URL:https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/30554/000104746911000602/a2201761z10-k.htm 
2008 Restructuring Program 
During 2008, in response to the challenging economic environment, the company initiated a global 
restructuring program to reduce costs and improve profitability across its businesses. The program 
included the elimination of approximately 2,500 positions principally located in Western Europe and the 
U.S. primarily supporting the motor vehicle and construction markets. As a result, a charge of $535 was 
recorded in employee separation / asset related charges, net, which pertains to the cost of goods sold and 
other operating charges financial statement line item. This charge included $287 related to employee 
severance costs, $18 of other non-personnel charges, and $230 of asset related charges, including $111 for 
asset shut-downs and $119 for asset impairments. 
The 2008 restructuring program charge of $535 reduced 2008 segment earnings as follows: Agriculture & 
Nutrition - $18; Electronics & Communications - $37; Performance Chemicals -$50; Performance 
Coatings - $209; Performance Materials - $94; Safety & Protection - $96; and Other - $31. 
In 2009, the company recorded a $100 net reduction in the estimated costs associated with the 2008 
restructuring program. This net reduction was primarily due to lower than estimated individual 
severance costs and workforce reductions through non-severance programs. The $100 net reduction 
impacted segment earnings for the year ended December 31, 2009 as follows: Agriculture & Nutrition - 
$1; Performance Chemicals - $3; Performance Coatings - $61; Performance Materials - $29; Safety & 
Protection - $2; and Other - $4. 
In the fourth quarter 2010, the company recorded a net reduction of $14 in the estimated costs 
associated with the 2008 restructuring program. This net reduction was primarily due to lower than 
estimated individual severance costs and work force reductions through non-severance programs. The net 
reduction of $14 impacted segment earnings for the twelve months ended December 31, 2010 as follows: 
Performance Coatings - $10; and Performance Materials - $3; and Other - $1. 
(Emphasis added) 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
Data selection procedure 
Excluded 
events 
Remaining  
events 
 
Select firm-quarter observations with (i) earnings announcements 
during the period starting 3 months before and ending 18 months 
after the beginning of the recessions of 2001 and 2008 (January 
2001–September 2002 and September 2007–May 2009), 
(ii) negative pre-tax write-downs, restructuring charges, and 
goodwill impairment (sum of COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and 
GDWLIP) greater than 1% of lagged total assets, and (iii) non-
missing financial data required for analysis 
  
1118 
 
Exclude oil and gas, utilities, and financial and banking industries 
(codes 30, 31, 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49 of Fama-French (1993) industry 
classification) 
 
79 
 
1039 
 
Retain only the first firm-quarter event per recession  
 
345 
 
694 
 
Exclude industries that have fewer than three write-offs per 
recession 
 
24 
 
670 
 
Exclude industries with no write-offs announced between 3 months 
before and 3 months after the beginning of the recession  
 
81 
 
589 
 
Final write-off sample 
  
589 
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TABLE 2 
Frequency and amount of write-offs  
 
Panel A: Frequency and amount of write-offs by industry-recession 
 
 All Leaders Followers 
Industry Name 
N Mean Median 
Std 
dev 
N Mean Median 
Std 
dev 
N Mean Median 
Std 
dev 
Recession 2001              
Recreation 3 0.021 0.020 0.009 2 0.025 0.025 0.006 1 0.012 0.012 . 
Printing and Publishing 7 0.018 0.017 0.007 3 0.012 0.011 0.002 4 0.023 0.023 0.005 
Consumer Goods 17 0.038 0.022 0.063 2 0.024 0.024 0.020 15 0.040 0.022 0.067 
Apparel 9 0.030 0.016 0.030 1 0.012 0.012 . 8 0.032 0.020 0.031 
Healthcare 4 0.023 0.022 0.015 1 0.037 0.037 . 3 0.018 0.010 0.014 
Medical Equipment 5 0.044 0.033 0.037 1 0.048 0.048 . 4 0.044 0.026 0.042 
Chemicals 11 0.025 0.023 0.015 2 0.020 0.020 0.004 9 0.026 0.025 0.017 
Construction Materials 12 0.025 0.013 0.032 4 0.013 0.012 0.002 8 0.031 0.015 0.038 
Steel Works 11 0.042 0.018 0.073 1 0.024 0.024 . 10 0.044 0.017 0.076 
Machinery 11 0.019 0.016 0.008 1 0.016 0.016 . 10 0.019 0.018 0.008 
Electrical Equipment 16 0.070 0.024 0.095 4 0.099 0.067 0.107 12 0.060 0.023 0.094 
Automobiles and Trucks 6 0.049 0.042 0.035 2 0.063 0.063 0.074 4 0.041 0.042 0.007 
Business Service 20 0.047 0.029 0.047 3 0.021 0.025 0.007 17 0.052 0.037 0.050 
Computers 19 0.049 0.040 0.036 5 0.055 0.041 0.038 14 0.047 0.038 0.037 
Computer Software 31 0.057 0.033 0.064 6 0.032 0.018 0.028 25 0.064 0.039 0.069 
Electronic Equipment 47 0.097 0.029 0.243 5 0.373 0.063 0.685 42 0.064 0.028 0.100 
Measuring and Control Equipment 7 0.024 0.019 0.014 2 0.027 0.027 0.019 5 0.023 0.019 0.014 
Business Supplies 4 0.050 0.033 0.051 1 0.125 0.125 . 3 0.026 0.024 0.015 
Transportation 5 0.083 0.060 0.084 1 0.060 0.060 . 4 0.089 0.066 0.096 
Wholesale 20 0.047 0.029 0.054 4 0.047 0.042 0.024 16 0.047 0.024 0.060 
Retail  16 0.036 0.024 0.032 6 0.029 0.014 0.038 10 0.040 0.032 0.029 
Total recession 2001 281 0.052 0.024 0.111 57 0.068 0.024 0.210 224 0.048 0.024 0.066 
Recession 2008             
Candy & Soda 4 0.075 0.035 0.094 1 0.036 0.036 . 3 0.088 0.034 0.111 
Recreation 5 0.029 0.020 0.025 2 0.018 0.018 0.003 3 0.036 0.024 0.032 
Consumer Goods 12 0.041 0.017 0.044 3 0.015 0.016 0.004 9 0.050 0.039 0.049 
Apparel 7 0.029 0.032 0.010 1 0.036 0.036 . 6 0.028 0.028 0.010 
Healthcare 4 0.131 0.110 0.109 1 0.025 0.025 . 3 0.166 0.139 0.102 
Medical Equipment 6 0.060 0.015 0.112 2 0.015 0.015 0.007 4 0.082 0.015 0.137 
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Pharmaceutical Products 10 0.066 0.026 0.113 3 0.032 0.033 0.020 7 0.081 0.020 0.134 
Chemicals 14 0.036 0.019 0.031 3 0.025 0.015 0.021 11 0.038 0.020 0.034 
Textiles 4 0.087 0.087 0.058 1 0.016 0.016 . 3 0.111 0.088 0.041 
Construction Materials 11 0.047 0.028 0.047 2 0.049 0.049 0.053 9 0.047 0.028 0.050 
Steel Works  10 0.038 0.026 0.032 1 0.014 0.014 . 9 0.041 0.030 0.033 
Electrical Equipment 10 0.096 0.068 0.083 2 0.112 0.112 0.027 8 0.093 0.040 0.093 
Automobiles and Trucks 9 0.035 0.015 0.042 3 0.011 0.011 0.001 6 0.047 0.031 0.048 
Communication 9 0.468 0.040 1.060 4 0.045 0.031 0.037 5 0.806 0.344 1.387 
Personal Service 4 0.092 0.052 0.112 1 0.085 0.085 . 3 0.094 0.018 0.137 
Business Service 36 0.080 0.037 0.100 7 0.039 0.037 0.028 29 0.089 0.036 0.109 
Computers 15 0.092 0.040 0.106 4 0.027 0.020 0.022 11 0.116 0.059 0.116 
Computer Software 21 0.071 0.021 0.096 5 0.034 0.019 0.040 16 0.082 0.042 0.106 
Electronic Equipment 45 0.066 0.028 0.078 9 0.073 0.014 0.126 36 0.064 0.036 0.063 
Business Supplies 7 0.044 0.043 0.021 3 0.034 0.031 0.024 4 0.052 0.055 0.019 
Shipping Containers 5 0.042 0.018 0.057 2 0.019 0.019 0.003 3 0.058 0.018 0.075 
Transportation 8 0.040 0.026 0.037 2 0.074 0.074 0.077 6 0.028 0.026 0.011 
Wholesale 21 0.105 0.092 0.097 3 0.015 0.012 0.006 18 0.121 0.118 0.097 
Retail  24 0.077 0.040 0.087 6 0.018 0.017 0.005 18 0.097 0.066 0.093 
Restaurants, Hotels 7 0.038 0.022 0.040 2 0.030 0.030 0.011 5 0.041 0.015 0.049 
Total recession 2008 308 0.078 0.030 0.200 73 0.038 0.020 0.052 235 0.091 0.040 0.226 
Total 589 0.066 0.026 0.164 130 0.051 0.021 0.145 459 0.070 0.029 0.170 
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Panel B: Frequency of write-offs relative to the beginning of the recession (month 0) 
 
Month relative to 
recession peak 
Frequency of 
write-offs 
Percent of  
write-offs 
Cumulative 
frequency  
Cumulative 
percent  
-3 1 0.17 1 0.17 
-2 21 3.57 22 3.74 
-1 10 1.70 32 5.43 
0 5 0.85 37 6.28 
1 45 7.64 82 13.92 
2 37 6.28 119 20.20 
3 11 1.87 130 22.07 
4 64 10.87 194 32.94 
5 25 4.24 219 37.18 
6 5 0.85 224 38.03 
7 45 7.64 269 45.67 
8 15 2.55 284 48.22 
9 8 1.36 292 49.58 
10 53 9.00 345 58.57 
11 27 4.58 372 63.16 
12 16 2.72 388 65.87 
13 55 9.34 443 75.21 
14 64 10.87 507 86.08 
15 25 4.24 532 90.32 
16 30 5.09 562 95.42 
17 24 4.07 586 99.49 
18 3 0.51 589 100 
 
This table reports the frequency and amount of write-offs. Write-offs are defined as observations when 
the sum of negative pre-tax write-downs, restructuring charges, and goodwill impairment (sum of 
COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GDWLIP) greater than 1% of lagged total assets. Leaders are 
defined as firms having write-offs during the period starting 3 months before and ending 3 months after 
the beginning of the recession. Followers are defined as firms having write-offs during the period starting 
3 months after the beginning of the recession and ending 18 months after the beginning of the recession. 
Industries are determined by the Fama-French (1993) 49-industry classification. 
Panel A reports the frequency and amount of write-offs by industry-recession.  
Panel B reports the frequency of write-offs relative to the beginning of the recessions. 
 
 
 
47 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics of write-offs sample 
 
 
Leaders Followers 
Difference between  
Leaders and Followers 
Variable 
N Mean Med 
Std. 
dev 
N Mean Med 
Std. 
dev 
Mean  Med  
WRITEOFF 130 0.051 0.021 0.145 459 0.070 0.029 0.170 -0.019  -0.007 *** 
Size 130 7.492 7.185 1.806 459 7.171 6.977 1.635 0.321 * 0.208 ** 
BM 130 0.401 0.360 0.455 459 0.504 0.402 0.805 -0.103 * -0.042  
BM 130 -0.011 -0.005 0.112 459 -0.004 -0.006 0.155 -0.007  0.001  
ROA 130 0.046 0.053 0.129 459 0.051 0.053 0.118 -0.005  0.000  
ROA 130 -0.006 -0.004 0.056 459 0.000 0.000 0.060 -0.006  -0.003 ** 
RET 130 -0.146 -0.113 0.451 459 -0.008 0.057 0.517 -0.138 ** -0.171 *** 
MKTShare 130 0.006 0.002 0.011 459 0.006 0.001 0.015 0.000  0.001 * 
SynEarn 130 0.161 0.070 0.199 459 0.147 0.077 0.173 0.014  -0.007  
SynRet 130 0.255 0.243 0.159 459 0.383 0.380 0.209 -0.128 *** -0.138 *** 
MGMT 130 0.169 0.000 0.376 459 0.133 0.000 0.340 0.036  0.000  
HIST 130 4.831 5.000 0.545 459 4.776 5.000 0.557 0.055  0.000  
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the write-off sample with 589 observations. Variable definitions: WRITEOFF is the sum of the 
write-downs, restructuring charges, and goodwill impairment (COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GDWLIP) deflated by the total assets at the 
end of the last fiscal year prior to the event quarter and converted to positive values. Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s average market value 
of equity in the four fiscal quarters before the write-off. BM is the book-to-market ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the write-off. 
BM is the mean change in firm i’s book-to-market ratio over years -5 to -1. ROA is the return on assets of firm i in the fiscal year before the 
event, calculated as income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets (COMPUSTAT mnemonic: IB/(lag AT)). ROA is the mean 
change in firm i’s return on assets ratio over years -5 to -1. RET is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i computed over the year preceding the 
write-off. MKTShare is the ratio of a firm’s total sales in the most recent fiscal year before the event quarter to the industry’s total sales in that 
year. SynEarn is the R
2
 of the regression of the firm’s return on assets (ROA) on the industry ROA (calculated as the total industry earnings 
divided by the total industry assets) in the 20 quarters before the event quarter. SynRet is the R
2
 of the regression of the firm’s weekly stock returns 
on the value-weighted market returns and industry returns in the calendar year before the event quarter. MGMT is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm experiences a change in the top three executives in the fiscal year before or the fiscal year of the write-off and zero 
otherwise. HIST is equal to the number of significant write-offs that exceed one percent of the lagged firm total assets reported by the firm in the 
previous five years.   
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 4 
Clustering of followers’ write-offs 
 
Panel A: Timing of Followers’ write-offs relative to the most recent peer’s write-off 
 
Month Frequency 
  
Percent 
Cumulative  
frequency 
Cumulative  
percent 
The same month 47   10.24 47 10.24 
1 248   54.03 295 64.27 
2 44   9.59 339 73.86 
3 61   13.29 400 87.15 
4 20   4.36 420 91.50 
5 7   1.53 427 93.03 
6 10   2.18 437 95.21 
7 9   1.96 446 97.17 
8 1   0.22 447 97.39 
9 0   0.00 447 97.39 
10 3   0.65 450 98.04 
11 3   0.65 453 98.69 
12 2   0.44 455 99.13 
13 4   0.87 459 100 
 
 
Panel B: Duration analysis of Followers’ write-offs.   
 
Coefficient z-stat 
Hazard 
ratio 
Peerwriteoff 0.02 ** 4.58 1.04 
UE -0.03  1.60 1.02 
Sale -0.01  0.18 1.03 
RET -0.12 *** 8.49 1.22 
Size -0.01  0.11 1.03 
MKTShare -0.07 *** 7.90 0.98 
SynEarn 0.00  0.01 1.04 
SynRet 0.02  0.14 1.10 
Wald-test 29.50    
Number of Followers 1687    
 
Panel A reports how soon Followers issue their write-offs after the most recent peer’s write-off. 
Panel B reports results for the Cox proportional hazard model: 
ℎ (𝑡𝑖) = ℎ0(𝑡𝑖)(𝑎0 +  𝑎1𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖 + 𝑎2𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝑎3∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝑎5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖
+ 𝑎6𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝑎7𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝑎8𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖) 
(1) 
where the hazard rate, ℎ (𝑡𝑖), is the probability density of a follower’s reporting write-off on day t, given 
that it has not reported write-offs the preceding t – 1 days, ℎ0(𝑡𝑖) is the unspecified baseline hazard rate, 
being the same for all firms. Explanatory variables: 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖 is the number of write-offs issued by 
industry peers in the three months preceding the earnings announcement of firm i. 𝑈𝐸𝑖  is the difference 
between the actual earnings and the latest outstanding analyst consensus forecast before the earnings 
announcement, deflated by the firm’s stock price at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event. 
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∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is firm i’s sales growth in the write-off quarter from the same quarter in the previous year. 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is 
the cumulative abnormal return of firm i computed over the year preceding the write-off. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖  is the 
natural logarithm of firm i’s average market value of equity in the four fiscal quarters before the write-off. 
𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖  is the ratio of firm i’s total sales in the most recent fiscal year before the event quarter to the 
industry’s total sales in that year. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 is the R
2
 of the regression of the firms’ return on assets 
(ROA) on the industry ROA (calculated as the total industry earnings divided by the total industry sales) 
in the 20 quarters before the event quarter. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 is the R
2
 of the regression of the firms’ weekly stock 
returns on the value-weighted market returns and industry returns in the calendar year before the event 
quarter. We rank 𝑈𝐸𝑖, ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖, 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖  into deciles among all 
firms in the industry quarter that are covered by COMPUSTAT and CRSP. The industry classification is 
based on the Fama and French (1993) 49-industry classification. The regression is estimated on 1687 
quarterly observations from 459 Followers.  
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 5  
Stock price sensitivity to write-offs  
 
Variable Coefficient z-stat 
Intercept -0.007  -0.76 
UE 0.290 *** 16.81 
WRITEOFF -0.154 * -1.78 
Follower 0.004  0.21 
WRITEOFF *Follower 0.182 ** 2.19 
Size 0.002  0.69 
BM 0.009  0.94 
SynRet -0.028 *** -2.23 
SynEarn -0.015  -0.45 
N_obs -0.007  -0.76 
Adj R
2
 2.37%     
F-test of 𝛾1 + 𝛾3 = 0 : 38.08
a
     
 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of the OLS regression in the following form: 
 
𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾3𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛾4𝑈𝐸𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛾6𝐵𝑀𝑖 +  𝛾7𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾8𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 +  𝜏𝑖 
(2) 
where 𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖 is firm i’s compound excess return over days 0 and +3 relative to the earnings 
announcement day, measured as the difference between the realized return and the corresponding size and 
book-to-market portfolio of the firm on the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe obtained from Professor 
Kenneth R. French’s website http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is the sum of the write-downs, restructuring charges, and goodwill impairment 
(COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GDWLIP), converted to positive values, and deflated by the total 
assets at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event quarter. 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is an indicator variable that 
equals one if firm i is a Follower and zero otherwise. 𝑈𝐸𝑖 is the difference between the actual earnings 
and the latest outstanding analyst consensus forecast before the earnings announcement, deflated by the 
firm’s stock price at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖  is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s average market value of equity in the four fiscal quarters before the write-off. 𝐵𝑀𝑖 is the book-to-
market ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the write-off. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 is the R
2
 of the 
regression of the firm’s return on assets (ROA) on the industry ROA (calculated as the total industry 
earnings divided by the total industry sales) in the 20 quarters before the event quarter. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖is the R
2
 
of the regression of the firms’ weekly stock returns on the value-weighted market returns and industry 
returns in the calendar year before the event quarter. We rank 𝑈𝐸𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝐵𝑀𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, and 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖  into deciles among all firms in the industry quarter that are covered by COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP. 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is ranked among the firms reporting large write-offs. The z-statistics are based on 
bootstrapped standard errors clustered by recession.  
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
a
 indicates statistical significance at the 1% level using an F-test.  
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TABLE 6 
Future performance of Leaders and Followers 
 
 Model 1: Dependent Variable 
industry-adjusted ΔROAt,t+2 
Model 2: Dependent Variable 
industry-adjusted ΔCFOt,t+2 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Intercept -0.014  -0.50 -0.036  -1.29 
Follower 0.024 ** 2.11 0.016  1.47 
WRITEOFF -0.517 *** -3.19 -0.154  -0.99 
WRITEOFF*Follower 0.191 * 1.91 -0.045  -0.48 
PERFt -0.639 *** -15.04 -0.698 *** -16.53 
PERFt-1,t -0.079  -1.56 -0.087 * -2.01 
ROA -0.176 ** -2.21 -0.277 *** -4.09 
BM 0.026  0.53 0.067  1.39 
SALEt-1,t 0.002  0.14 -0.012  -0.94 
INDGROWTH -0.005  -0.44 0.021 * 1.78 
FINLEV -0.003  -1.61 -0.006 *** -2.89 
SIZE 0.005  1.39 0.010 *** 3.13 
BM -0.025 ** -2.50 -0.022 * -2.28 
MKTShare 0.149  0.47 -0.278  -0.90 
MGMT -0.017  -1.43 -0.002  -0.20 
SynEarn -0.045 ** -1.95 0.009  0.40 
SynRet -0.015  -0.63 -0.052 ** -2.25 
N_obs  556   556   
Adj R
2
 38.51%     43.99%     
 
This table presents the regression coefficient of the following OLS regression: 
 
∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 =  𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 +  𝛾2𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖
+  𝛾4𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾5∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 +  𝛾6∆𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡 +  𝛾7∆𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡
+  𝛾8∆𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 +  +𝛾9𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡 + 𝛾10𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛾110𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾12𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾13𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛾14∆𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡
+  𝛾15𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾16𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖 
(3) 
where the dependent variables, ∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2, measure the change in the future performance of firm i from 
the event year t to two years after the event. Models 1 uses ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 as a dependant variable, and  
Model 2 uses ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+2 as a dependent variable. ROA is calculated as the ratio of income before 
extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item IB) to the total assets (COMPUSTAT item AT). CFO is 
calculated as the ratio of cash from operations (COMPUSTAT item OANCF) to the total assets. All 
performance variables are adjusted by industry performance by subtracting the industry median of either 
ROA or CFO. 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i had write-offs that exceed 1% of 
total assets during the period starting 3 months before and ending 3 months after the beginning of the 
recession, and zero otherwise. 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the sum of the write-downs, restructuring charges, and 
goodwill impairment (COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GDWLIP), converted to a positive amount, 
and deflated by the total assets at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event quarter. 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡 takes 
the values of the industry-adjusted ROA or CFO in the event year in Models 1 and 2, respectively. 
∆𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 is the change in these measures from one year before the event year to the event year. 
∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 is the mean change in firm i’s return on assets ratio over years -5 to -1. ∆𝐵𝑀𝑖 is the mean change 
in the book-to-market ratio over years -5 to -1 prior to the event year. SALEt-1,t  is the sales growth in the 
year prior to the event year. 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡−5,𝑡 is computed as the mean change in aggregated industry 
sales over the five years prior to the event year. 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of total assets (COMPUSTAT 
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item TA) to the book value (COMPUSTAT item CEQ) at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖   is the natural logarithm of the firm’s average market value of equity in the four fiscal quarters 
before the write-off. 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the ratio of the firm’s total sales in the most recent fiscal year 
before the event quarter to the industry’s total sales in that year. ∆𝑀𝐺𝑀𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1,𝑡 is change in the top 
management, which is defined as an indicator variable that equals one if the firm experiences a change in 
the top three executives either in the write-off year or in the prior year. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the R
2
 of the 
regression of the firm’s return on assets (ROA) on the industry ROA (calculated as total industry earnings 
divided by total industry sales) in the 20 quarters before the event quarter. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the R
2
 of the 
regression of the firm’s weekly stock returns on the value-weighted market returns and industry returns in 
the calendar year before the event quarter.  
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 7 
Reversals of Restructuring Charges 
 
Panel A: Frequency of restructuring charges reversals 
 
 Leader Follower Difference in 
frequency  
 Total # reversed % reversed Total # reversed % reversed Chi-stat  P-value 
Year1  130 19 14.62 453 140 30.91 13.51 0.000 
Year2 129 28 21.71 447 135 30.20 3.56 0.059 
Year3 126 22 17.46 428 100 23.36 1.98 0.160 
 
 
Panel B: Logistic regression of the reversals of restructuring charges  
 
 
Coefficient z-stat 
Odds 
ratio 
Intercept -0.05 *** 1.93  
Follower 0.55 *** 8.03 2.13 
Shortfall 0.75 *** 15.87 1.55 
WRITEOFF 0.44 *** 8.95 0.97 
INST -0.03  1.35 1.00 
Analyst 0.00 *** 0.00 0.91 
RD -0.09  7.13 1.04 
LOSS 0.03  1.22 1.19 
Size 0.17 *** 0.42 1.39 
BM 0.33 *** 34.39 1.13 
SynEarn 0.12  14.66 1.03 
SynRet 0.03 * 1.18 0.95 
N_obs 1069    
Reverse 296    
Did not Reverse 773    
Likelihood Ratio 68.89    
Wald 60.66     
 
Panel A reports the frequency of the reversals of restructuring. We hand collected the instances of 
reversals for three fiscal years after the event quarter from the 10-K reports available on the Edgar 
reporting portal of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Out of 589 firms in our sample, we located 
10-K reports for 583, 576, and 554 firms for the first, second, and third fiscal years after the write-off 
quarter, respectively. 
 
Panel B reports the results of the logistic regression modeling the probability of reversals of restructuring 
charges in the two years after a big write-off: 
 
Pr(𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑁) = 𝐹(𝜇0 + 𝜂1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜂2𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖 + 𝜂3𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 +  𝜂4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖
+ 𝜂5𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖 +  𝜂6𝑅𝐷𝑖 +  𝜂7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝜂8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝜂9𝐵𝑀𝑖
+  𝜂10𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 +  𝜂11𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 +  𝜉𝑖) 
(4) 
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑁 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i reverses restructuring charges in the year N 
after a write-off, and zero otherwise. N takes values 1 or 2. 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 
one if firm i had write-offs that exceed 1% of total assets during the period starting 3 months before and 
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ending 3 months after the beginning of the recession, and zero otherwise. 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖, is an indicator 
variable that equals one if a firm’s pre-reversal earnings are below consensus analysts’ forecasts and zero 
otherwise, where pre-reversal earnings are computed as actual earnings reported on IBES minus reversal 
amount multiplied by statutory tax rate of 40 percent. 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is the sum of the write-downs, 
restructuring charges, and goodwill impairment (COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and GDWLIP) 
deflated by the total assets at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event quarter, converted to a 
positive value. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the percent of shares outstanding held by institutions. 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖 is the number of 
analysts following the company. 𝑅𝐷𝑖 is the research and development expense (COMPUSTAT item 
XRD) divided by the total assets at the end of the fiscal year before the event. 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 is an indicator 
variable that equals one if firm i reports a negative income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT 
item IB) in the fiscal year before the write-off, and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s average market value of equity in the four fiscal quarters before the write-off. 𝐵𝑀𝑖 is the book-to-
market ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the write-off. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 is the R
2
 of the 
regression of the firms’ return on assets (ROA) on the industry ROA (calculated as the total industry 
earnings divided by the total industry sales) in the 20 quarters before the event quarter. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 is the R
2
 
of the regression of the firms’ weekly stock returns on the value-weighted market returns and industry 
returns in the calendar year before the event quarter. We rank 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖, 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖, 𝑅𝐷𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝐵𝑀𝑖, 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 into deciles among all firms in the industry-quarter that are covered by 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP. 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is ranked among the firms in our sample. z-statistics based on 
clustered by firm and year standard errors. 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 8 
Reversals of restructuring charges and meeting or beating analysts’ expectations 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient z-stat Odds ratio Coefficient z-stat Odds ratio 
Intercept 0.417  0.66   -1.715 *** 3.88  
Follower 0.395 ** 5.77 1.48 -0.284  0.79 0.75 
Reversal     -0.430  0.57 0.65 
Reversal*Follower     1.232 ** 3.80 3.43 
WRITEOFF -0.025  0.71 0.98 0.039  0.70 1.04 
INST -0.030  1.07 0.97 0.007  0.02 1.01 
RD 0.035  1.18 1.04 -0.021  0.17 0.98 
LOSS -0.070  0.08 0.93 -0.468  0.77 0.63 
Analyst -0.051  2.04 0.95 -0.062  1.07 0.94 
|FE| -0.132 *** 20.08 0.88 -0.193 *** 16.31 0.83 
Size 0.181 *** 12.44 1.20 0.336 *** 12.59 1.40 
BM -0.075 ** 5.66 0.93 -0.103 * 4.02 0.90 
SynEarn -0.002  0.01 1.00 0.045  1.07 1.05 
SynRet 0.051  2.27 1.05 -0.020  0.10 0.98 
Sample  Full sample 
Firms that fail to meet analysts’ forecasts 
based on pre-reversal earnings 
N_obs 1065     435    
Meet/Exceed 760     130    
Did not meet 305     305    
Likelihood Ratio 97.60     89.26    
Wald 88.30       66.48       
 
This table presents results from the logistic regression modeling the probability of meeting or beating the 
latest outstanding median consensus analyst forecast before the annual earnings announcement two years 
after a big write-off: 
 
Pr(𝑀𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑁) = 𝐹(𝜅0 +  𝜅1𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜅2𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁  + 𝜅3𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑁 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 +
  𝜅4𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 + 𝜅5𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜅6𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 𝜅7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝜅8𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖  + 𝜅9|𝐹𝐸| + 𝜅10𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +
 𝜅11𝐵𝑀𝑖 + 𝜅12𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 +  𝜅13𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 +  𝜗𝑖)  
(5) 
 
Model 1 is estimated on the 1065 firm-year observations, which is a full sample of firms with large write-
offs and available consensus analysts’ forecast during two fiscal years after a write-off. 
Model 2 is estimated on the 435 firm-year observations, which is the sample of firms who would fail to 
meet analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts based on pre-reversal earnings. Pre-reversal earnings 
are computed as actual earnings reported on IBES minus reversal amount multiplied by statutory tax rate 
of 40 percent. If a firm does not reverse restructuring charges, pre-reversal earnings are equal to actual 
reported earnings. Dependent variable is the probability of meeting/beating analysts’ forecast of annual 
earnings in the year N after the write-off. N is equal 1 or 2. 𝐹𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals 
one if firm i had write-offs that exceed 1% of total assets during the period starting 3 months before and 
ending 3 months after the beginning of the recession, and zero otherwise. 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is the sum of the 
write-downs, restructuring charges, and goodwill impairment (COMPUSTAT items WDP, RCP, and 
GDWLIP) deflated by the total assets at the end of the last fiscal year prior to the event quarter, converted 
to a positive value. 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the percent of shares outstanding held by institutions. 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖 is the number 
of analysts following the company. 𝑅𝐷𝑖 is the research and development expense (COMPUSTAT item 
XRD) divided by the total assets at the end of the fiscal year before the event. |𝐹𝐸𝑖| is the absolute value 
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of the difference between reported earnings and the initial consensus forecast (measured as the first 
forecast after the prior quarter’s earnings announcement), deflated by the stock price at the end of the last 
year before the write-off. 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖 is an indicator variable that equals one if firm i reports a negative income 
before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item IB) in the fiscal year before the write-off, and zero 
otherwise. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 is the natural logarithm of the firm’s average market value of equity in the four fiscal 
quarters before the write-off. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖 is the R
2
 of the regression of the firms’ return on assets (ROA) 
on the industry ROA (calculated as the total industry earnings divided by the total industry sales) in the 
20 quarters before the event quarter. 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 is the R
2
 of the regression of the firms’ weekly stock returns 
on the value-weighted market returns and industry returns in the calendar year before the event quarter. 
We rank 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖, 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖, 𝑅𝐷𝑖, 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖, 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖, and 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖 into deciles among all firms in the 
industry-quarter that are covered by COMPUSTAT and CRSP. 𝑊𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖 is ranked among the firms 
in our sample. z-statistics based on clustered by firm and year standard errors. z-statistics based on 
clustered by firm and year standard errors.  
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
